Preferences over public good, political delegation and leadership in tax competition by Pal, Rupayan & Sharma, Ajay
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Preferences over public good, political
delegation and leadership in tax
competition
Rupayan Pal and Ajay Sharma
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Indian Institute
of Management Indore
18 December 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/92861/
MPRA Paper No. 92861, posted 22 March 2019 09:29 UTC
1 
 
Preferences over Public Good, Political Delegation and Leadership 
in Tax Competition 
 
Rupayan Pal 
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai (India) 
 
Ajay Sharma
1
 
Indian Institute of Management, Indore (India) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Leadership (sequential choice) and political delegation are two mechanisms suggested to restrict 
„race-to-the-bottom‟ in tax competition. In this paper, we analyze whether these two mechanisms 
when combined together would lead to unilaterally higher taxation or not. We show that political 
delegation with leadership in tax competition not only restricts „race-to-the-bottom‟ but also 
mitigates the possibility of overprovision of public good. In sequential choice game, only the 
follower region delegates taxation power to the policy maker but not the leader region. This puts 
a check on intensity of tax competition and leads to optimal provision of public good.  
Keywords: Political delegation, Foreign-owned mobile capital, Sequential tax competition, 
Public good provision, Fiscal competition 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Standard models of tax competition for attracting capital predict countries engage themselves in 
„race-to-the-bottom‟ and thus end up with lower tax rates and under provision of public goods in 
equilibrium (Zodrow, G. R., & Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1999). However, empirical evidence 
seems to contradict such predictions (Marceau et al, 2010). Several attempts have been made to 
explain this contradiction. Janeba and Peters (1999), Plümper, Troeger, and Winner (2009) and 
Marceau, Mongrain and Wilson (2010) argue that, if countries differ in terms of size and 
endowment of immobile capital and fiscal rigidities, competition for mobile capital does not lead 
to lower tax rate in all the countries involved. Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010) demonstrate that 
equilibrium tax rates are higher under sequential tax competition compared with that under 
simultaneous tax competition, even in the case of symmetric countries.  
Another strand of literature that attempts to explain higher tax rates and no „race-to the-bottom‟ 
among countries focuses on political economy of taxation and public good provision for 
heterogeneous voters. Persson and Tabellini (1992) demonstrate that in the presence of 
representative democracies each region‟s median voter appoints a policy maker who prefers 
higher tax rate than that of the median voter, if capital endowments of citizens of a region are 
heterogeneous. In other words, political delegation takes place in each region due to tax 
competition and harmful race-to-the-bottom in tax rates is restricted. Brueckner (2001) and Ihori 
and Yang (2009) argue that this result is quite robust to considering the heterogeneity for 
preference over public good and income respectively
2
.  
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 Some other studies that explore this strand are these. Fuest and Huber (2001) consider capital and labour tax as 
well as political competition. We note here that these papers also deal with the issue of tax coordination, which is 
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In these strands of literature, we focus on two mechanisms that are explored to provide 
theoretical justification for empirical evidence on control in „race-to-the-bottom‟. While the first 
strand‟s emphasis is on either regional asymmetry or nature of competition (simultaneous, 
sequential); the second strand highlights the implications of political economy aspect of capital 
taxation. Though these studies provide independent and plausible justification behind restriction 
in „race-to-the-bottom‟, not much theoretical understanding exists on the interaction of these two 
mechanisms and their impact on tax rates, capital allocation and related outcomes.  
The objective of this paper is to analyze tax competition when these mechanisms are synthesized 
together
3
. Particularly, we consider the case where regions have a representative democracy and 
policy maker is elected by majority voting; next policy makers in both the regions decide the tax 
rate sequentially (i.e. regions act as leader and follower). The focus of this model is to include 
the features of political delegation and leadership in tax competition. We intend to understand 
the implication of such structure of decision making on capital taxation. Especially whether 
combination of these mechanisms can lead to very high tax rates or there is a corrective 
mechanism which can lead to a check on the increasing tax rates. In other words, we intend to 
analyze whether there is an optimal level of tax rate that is desirable by the governments arising 
endogenously (as suggested in Marceau et al., 2010).  
                                                                                                                                                                           
beyond the scope of the present paper. Other papers in this stream of literature do not consider representative 
democracy. Rauscher (1998) and Edwards and Keen  (1996) consider that governments are concerned about size of 
public sector as in “Leviathan models”, Wilson (2005) assume self interested  bureaucrats decide the public 
expenditure policy while electorates decide the tax policy, and  Perroni and Scharf (2001) assume direct democracy 
in competing regions. 
3
 There exist a handful of studies analyzing the empirical evidence for leadership in taxation as well as political 
economy aspect of taxation. Altshuler and Goodspeed (2015), establish that there is leadership in tax rate 
determination in the context of USA and European countries, with USA acting as leader and European countries 
follow. In the context of political economy, Ashworth and Heyndels (1997), analyze the politician‟s preference for 
local taxation and find that the policy makers have inclination towards moderate and higher tax rates with a focus on 
getting re-elected. Osterloh and Debus (2012) empirically establish the hypothesis that left leaning policy makers 
opt for higher tax rates, in the context of European countries.  
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This study is closer to Ihori and Yang (2009) and Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010) in its 
structure of the model. The main deviations from these papers are as follows. First, we analyze 
and compare both sequential and simultaneous choice of tax rates by the regions (in the spirit of 
Kempf and Rota-Graziosi, 2010), which is different from Ihori and Yang (2009), which only 
consider simultaneous tax competition. Further instead of capital endowment heterogeneity 
(Ihori and Yang, 2009; Persson and Tabellini, 1992), we focus on public good heterogeneity 
across citizens. The political delegation through majority voting is in line with Ihori and Yang, 
(2009). We deviate from Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010), in a sense that we do not explicitly 
model the endogenous choice of leadership in the tax competition. We consider it to be 
exogenous in the model
4
. The reason is that our main focus remains on the interaction of intra-
regional political competition and inter-regional sequential tax competition and their effect on 
taxation and capital allocation across regions.  
The main findings from our model are as follows. We show that, in the first stage of the model, 
the follower region‟s voters delegate the task to decide its tax rate on capital to a candidate 
whose preference for public good is more than that of the median voter, as in the case of 
simultaneous move game. In other words, such policy maker will levy higher tax rate to provide 
for public good. On contrary, no such political delegation takes place in the leader region, in 
which the median voter herself becomes the policy maker and decides the tax rate. This result is 
new
5
.  
The intuition behind the result is as follows. In the first stage, the median voters of both the 
region anticipate that, for any given tax rate of the leader region, the follower region has the 
                                                     
4
 The endogenous choice of leader and follower in tax competition with political delegation can be explored in 
future research, but remains beyond the scope of this study. 
5
 In the literature (Ihori and Yang, 2009; Persson and Tabellini, 1992 and others), we observe that in simultaneous 
tax competition, the voters in a region have unilateral incentive to delegate the policy making. 
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incentive to set a lower tax rate in the second stage. However, if the follower region can credibly 
convey to the leader region that it would prefer not to engage in tax undercutting, which is 
possible only by delegating the task to decide the tax rate to a policy maker with stronger 
preference for public goods than that of the median voter, the leader region would set a higher 
tax rate compared to that in the case of no delegation in the follower region. That is, by making 
political delegation in the first stage the follower region can induce the leader region not to 
engage in race-to-the-bottom.  
On the other hand, the leader region being at a disadvantageous position, since it needs to set the 
tax rate first, does not have any incentive to set a tax rate that is higher than its median voter‟s 
preferred tax rate. Moreover, the leader region also recognizes that it is harmful to set a tax rate 
that is lower than the median voter‟s preferred rate, since that would induce the follower region 
to set a lower tax rate. As result, no political delegation takes place in the leader region, unlike as 
in the follower region or in the case of simultaneous move tax competition. Clearly, timings of 
moves in tax competition have implications for political competition, which, in turn, affect the 
equilibrium tax rates.  These findings also highlight that with implementation of leadership and 
political delegation, the tax rate imposed by the regions does not shoot up, but there is a 
corrective mechanism at place due to the following reasons. First, the sequential choice of tax 
rates restricts the „race-to-the-bottom‟ by providing a credible mechanism where one region 
commits to a tax rate and the follower region though charges a lower tax rate, does not lead to 
the undercutting race. Second, political delegation with heterogeneous preferences for public 
good among the citizens, there is a natural restriction on tax rates in race-to-the-bottom due to 
provision of public good through tax revenue generation. In this model, what is interesting is that 
regions do not necessarily use both the mechanism to restrict the race but can opt for one or both 
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based on some optimal and desirable level of tax rate and corresponding tax revenue for 
providing public good to the residents.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline the model with intra-
regional political competition and inter-regional tax competition.  In section 3, we solve the case 
of simultaneous tax competition to provide the benchmark case. Followed by that, in section 4, 
we get the results in sequential tax competition. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. BASIC MODEL 
We consider two symmetric regions, i.e. 1 and 2, competing for foreign owned mobile capital 
using tax rates. Each of the two regions provides local public good, which is fully financed by 
tax revenue. Each of the two regions is inhabited by 𝑁 individuals (voters). There are two factors 
of production: labour (𝐿) and capital (𝑋). Labour is immobile, while capital is fully mobile.  
For simplicity, we assume that each region has a fixed endowment of labour, normalized to one 
i.e L=1. Moreover, each individual is endowed with equal amount of labour,  𝜃 =
1
𝑁
. Total 
amount of available capital is assumed to be X, which is allocated between the two regions 
through a perfectly competitive capital market.  
The production function of representative firm of region i is given by 𝑌 = 𝐹(𝑋𝑖 , 𝐿𝑖),  𝑖 = 1, 2, 
where 𝑋𝑖  is capital allocated to region 𝑖 and 𝐿𝑖 = 1, assuming full employment. This production 
function in an intensive form can be written as  𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 ), where 𝑥𝑖 =
𝑋𝑖
𝐿𝑖
= 𝑋𝑖 , 𝑓
′ 𝑥𝑖 > 0 , 
𝑓 ′′ 𝑥𝑖 < 0,  𝑓
′′′ 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 and 𝑓
′′′ 𝑥𝑖 =  𝑓
′′′ 𝑥𝑗   , as in Laussel and Le Burton (1998).  
7 
 
Capital allocation: Capital market is assumed to be perfectly competitive, capital is paid 
according to its marginal productivity net of taxes, [𝑓 ′ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖], where 𝑡𝑖  is the tax rate in region 
i.
6
 To rule out the possibility of arbitrage in equilibrium, we have [𝑓 ′ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖] = [𝑓
′ 𝑥𝑗  −
𝑡𝑗 ];   𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2;   𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. We consider that available mobile capital is fully allocated between the 
two regions (𝑥1 + 𝑥2 = 𝑋) and net return from the last unit of investment is positive ([𝑓
′ 𝑥𝑖 −
𝑡𝑖] > 0, ∀𝑖 = 1, 2). Therefore, for any 𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , the arbitrage proof allocation of mobile capital 
between two regions is given by, 𝑓 ′ 𝑥1 − 𝑡1 = 𝑓
′ 𝑥2 − 𝑡2  > 0 and 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 = 𝑋. 
The equilibrium allocation of capital, given the tax rates, between the two regions is as follows: 
𝑥1 = 𝑥1 𝑡1, 𝑡2 ,  𝑥2 = 𝑥2 𝑡1, 𝑡2  along with following conditions:  
        
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
=  
1
𝑓 ′′ 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑓 ′′ 𝑥𝑗  
= −
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑗
 < 0,                              (1𝑎)  
   
 𝜕2𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
2 =
−  𝑓 ′′′ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑓
′′′ 𝑥𝑗   
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
 𝑓 ′′ 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑓 ′′ 𝑥𝑗   
2 = 0                                 (1𝑏)  
and 
𝜕2𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑗 𝑡𝑖
=
 𝑓 ′′′ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑓
′′′ 𝑥𝑗   
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
 𝑓 ′′ 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑓 ′′ 𝑥𝑗   
2 = 0,                                (1𝑐) 
where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗; since 𝑓 ′′ 𝑥𝑖 < 0 and  𝑓
′′′ 𝑥𝑖 =  𝑓
′′′ 𝑥𝑗  . To ensure existence of interior 
solution, we assume that the elasticity (𝜂𝑖) of capital allocation to a region with respect to that 
region‟s tax rate is less than one:  
             𝜂𝑖 = −  
𝑡𝑖  𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝑥𝑖  𝜕𝑡𝑖
< 1, 𝑖 = 1, 2.                                                 (2) 
                                                     
6
 Price of good y is assumed to be one. 
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Individuals’ (citizens’) characteristics: Utility function of a typical individual n of region i is 
as follows.  
𝑈𝑛 ,𝑖 𝑐𝑛 ,𝑖  , 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑐𝑛 ,𝑖 + 𝛼𝑛 ,𝑖𝑣 𝑔𝑖 ,                                                             (3) 
where 𝑐𝑛 ,𝑖  is the amount of private good consumed by individual n of region i, 𝑔𝑖 is the amount of 
public good available in region i, 𝛼𝑛 ,𝑖  (> 0) represents the preference of that individual for 
public good and 𝑣 ′ 𝑔𝑖 > 0 > 𝑣
′′(𝑔𝑖) , 𝑖 = 1, 2, 𝑛 = 1,2, … . , 𝑁 . Clearly, higher value of 
𝛼𝑛 ,𝑖  indicates stronger preference for public good, and each individual has singled peaked 
preference for public good. We assume that distribution of 𝛼𝑛  is symmetric across regions, 
which implies that 𝛼𝑛 ,𝑖 = 𝛼𝑛 ,𝑗 = 𝛼𝑛 . The median of distribution of 𝛼𝑛  is assumed to be 𝛽 , 
indicating each region‟s median voter‟s preference for public good. We also assume that the 
measure of relative risk aversion with respect to public good consumption is less that one. 
−  
𝑔𝑖 𝑣
′′(𝑔𝑖)
𝑣 ′ 𝑔𝑖 
< 1, 𝑖 = 1, 2                                                                         (4) 
Condition (4) implies that, due to increase in public good, marginal utility of public good 
decreases less than proportionately than the increase in public good. This means with increase in 
the income level of individual, the preference for public good still remains strong. This is a 
standard assumption holding for a large class of utility functions and is in line with the 
behavioral aspects of individuals (Pratt, 1964). 
Moving on, note that, if 𝑥𝑖  amount of mobile capital is invested in region i, gross returns to the 
owners of mobile capital from investment in region i is [𝑥𝑖𝑓
′ 𝑥𝑖 ], since capital is paid according 
to its marginal productivity. And, the total wage bill paid to region i is  [𝑓 𝑥𝑖 −   𝑥𝑖𝑓
′ 𝑥𝑖 ]. Each 
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individual supplies 𝜃 =
1
𝑁
  amount of labour, we can write the budget constraint of a typical 
individual n of region i as follows.  
𝑐𝑛 ,𝑖 = 𝜃 𝑓 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖𝑓
′ 𝑥𝑖  , 𝑖 = 1, 2                                                                             (5)  
Governments’ budget constraints: Since public good is fully financed by the tax revenue, the 
balanced budget constraint of the government of region i can be written as,  
𝑔𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖𝑥𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2.                                                                                                               6   
Substituting  (4), (5) and (6) in equation (3), we can write the utility function of a typical 
individual n of region i as follows. 
𝑈𝑛 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗  = 𝜃 𝑐𝑛 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗  +  𝛼𝑛 ,𝑖  𝑣 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗    
                  =   𝜃  𝑓  𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗    − 𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗   𝑓
′  𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗    + 𝛼𝑛 ,𝑖𝑣  𝑡𝑖  𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗   ,    (7)  
where 𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗   is obtained from capital market condition. To keep the analysis tractable, we 
assume that the utility function 𝑈𝑛 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗   is concave in  𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗  . 
In this setting, how tax rate of own region and the other region affect the provision of public 
good and utility from it is characterized as follows: 
Lemma 1:  Utility of public good increases at a decreasing rate with increase in own tax rate, 
and, this effect is increasing in rival region’s tax rate: 
 
𝜕[α𝑛 ,𝑖  𝑣 𝑔𝑖 ]
𝜕𝑡𝑖
> 0, 
𝜕2[α𝑛 ,𝑖  𝑣 𝑔𝑖 ]
𝜕𝑡𝑖
2 < 0 and  
𝜕2[α𝑛 ,𝑖  𝑣 𝑔𝑖 ]
𝜕𝑡𝑗 𝜕𝑡𝑖
> 0 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2; 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.  
Proof:  See Appendix A1. 
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Political setup and voting mechanism: We consider that there is representative democracy in 
each of the two regions. The representative of citizens i.e. the policy maker, is determined 
through political competition guided by the majority voting rule, as in Osborne and Slivinski 
(1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). Next, the policy makers of the two regions decide tax rates.  
We assume that there is no cost attached to contest in election and, thus, each individual is a 
possible candidate. Moreover, individuals‟ preferences over tax rates are assumed to be single 
peaked.
7
 That is, an individual prefers a particular tax rate the most, and her utility is decreasing 
in absolute difference between that tax rate and the actual tax rate. Therefore, by the median 
voter theorem, the median voter of a region decides the policy maker of that region.
8
 Please refer 
to the appendix of the paper for detailed definition of single peaked property and median voter 
theorem. 
Theorem
9
:If  tax rate (𝑡) is a single dimensional choice and all the voters have single peaked  
preferences defined over  tax rate, the selection of the median voter cannot lose under majority 
voting rule. 
Proof: See Appendix A2.  
Note that the median voter of a region herself need not necessarily be the policy maker of that 
region. Following the tradition of existing literature, if the policy maker is someone different 
from the median voter, we say that there is political delegation. On the other hand, we say that 
there is no political delegation, if median voter herself is the policy maker. Nevertheless, in the 
case of political delegation, the median voter selects such a policy maker whose optimum policy 
maximizes the objective of the median voter, since the policy maker must have the support of the 
majority.  
Having outlined the model, the next section analyzes the simultaneous tax competition case.  
 
                                                     
7
The policy preference of a voter is said to be single peaked, if his preference ordering for alternative choices is 
dictated by their relative distance from his\her bliss point (Persson and Tabellini, 2000).  
8
If the individual voters have single peaked preferences over a given ordering of the policy alternatives, a Condorcet 
winner always exists and coincides with the median voter‟s policy choice. See, Persson and Tabellini (2000) for an 
excellent discussion on voting mechanism and median voter theorem. 
9
 Dennis Mueller (2003) 
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3. SIMULTANEOUS MOVE TAX COMEPTITION 
 
In this section, we consider that the policy makers of the two regions are engaged in 
simultaneous move tax competition. The stages of the game involved are as follows. 
Stage 1: Policy makers of the two regions are elected through political competition, guided 
by majority voting rule, in the two regions. In other words, each region‟s 
median voter decides whether to delegate the task to determine its tax rate or 
not. 
Stage 2: Policy makers of the two regions decide their respective tax rates simultaneously 
and independently. 
Stage 3: Owners of mobile capital decide the allocation of capital between the two regions. 
We note here that Ihori and Yang (2009) also consider a similar setup. Since our primary interest 
is to examine the implications of timing of move in tax competition, it is important to present the 
results corresponding to simultaneous move tax competition in order to alienate the effects of 
timing of move.  
We solve the game using standard backward induction method, starting from Stage 3. Note that, 
in Stage 3, allocation of capital between the two regions is determined by condition (1a) and 
(1b), irrespective of the nature of tax competition (simultaneous or sequential) and outcome of 
Stage 1. Moreover, conditions (1a)-(1c) always hold true, irrespective of timing of move in tax 
competition. 
Now, in Stage 2, the problem of the policy maker of region i, denoted by (p, i), can be written as 
follows.  
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑡𝑖
𝑈𝑝 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗  = 𝜃 𝑐𝑝 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗  +  𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖  𝑣 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗  ,                                            (8)  
Where expressions for 𝑐𝑝 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗   and 𝑣 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗   are as in (7) corresponding to 𝑛 = 𝑝; ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2; 
𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 .  
The first order condition of problem (8) can be written as,   
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𝜕𝑈𝑝 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗  
𝜕𝑡𝑖
= 𝜃  −𝑥𝑖𝑓′′ 𝑥𝑖 
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
 +  𝛼𝑝𝑖 𝑣
′ 𝑔𝑖  𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
+ 𝑥𝑖 = 0                        (9𝑎) 
The second order condition of maximization is satisfied, since U(.) is assumed to be concave. 
Therefore, the tax reaction functions of the two policy makers are given by (9a).  
Lemma 2: The absolute slope of the tax reaction function of the region j’s policy maker, in 
𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑗   plane, is less than one : 
 𝜕𝑡𝑗
𝜕𝑡𝑖
 
𝑝 ,𝑗
< 1, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
Proof: See Appendix A3.  
 
Lemma 2 implies that the slope of the region i‟s policy maker in 𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑗   plane, is greater than 
one,  
𝜕𝑡𝑗
𝜕𝑡𝑖
 
𝑝 ,𝑖
> 1, since  
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑗
 
𝑝 ,𝑖
< 1. 
Now, note that  
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,𝑗  𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗  
𝜕𝑡𝑖𝜕𝑡𝑗
=  𝜃 𝑥𝑗 𝑓
′′′ 𝑥𝑗  + 𝑓
′′ 𝑥𝑗    
𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝜕𝑡𝑗
 
2
 + {α𝑝 ,𝑗  𝑣
′ 𝑔𝑗  +  𝑣
′′ 𝑔𝑗  𝑔𝑗  1 −
𝜂𝑗   
𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝜕𝑡𝑖
},  𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗,  which can be positive or negative, depending on the nature of the 
functional forms considered. Because, though the second term is positive (by Lemma 1), the sign 
of the first term is ambiguous. Therefore, for 
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,𝑗  𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗  
𝜕𝑡𝑖𝜕𝑡𝑗
  to be negative, the first term must be 
negative and its magnitude must be greater than the magnitude of the second term. 
Otherwise,
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,𝑗  𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗  
𝜕𝑡𝑖𝜕𝑡𝑗
is positive. In other words, marginal effect of own tax rate on utility of a 
policy maker increases due to increase in the rival region‟s tax rate, i.e. tax rates are strategic 
complements, if 
𝜕2[𝜃c𝑝 ,𝑗  (.)]
𝜕𝑡 𝑖 𝜕𝑡𝑗
> 0 or  
𝜕2[𝜃c𝑝 ,𝑗  (.)]
𝜕𝑡 𝑖 𝜕𝑡𝑗
 <  
𝜕2[α𝑝 ,𝑗𝑣 𝑔𝑗  ]
𝜕𝑡 𝑖 𝜕𝑡𝑗
 .  Otherwise, tax rates are strategic 
substitutes. We summarize these results in Lemma 3. 
 
Lemma 3: Tax rates can be either strategic substitutes or strategic complements. If 
𝜕2[𝜃𝑐𝑝 ,𝑗  (.)]
𝜕𝑡 𝑖 𝜕𝑡𝑗
>
0  or  
𝜕2[𝜃𝑐𝑝 ,𝑗  (.)]
𝜕𝑡 𝑖 𝜕𝑡𝑗
 <  
𝜕2[𝛼𝑝 ,𝑗𝑣 𝑔𝑗  ]
𝜕𝑡 𝑖 𝜕𝑡𝑗
 , tax rates are strategic complements. Alternatively,     
if  
𝜕2[𝜃𝑐𝑝 ,𝑗  (.)]
𝜕𝑡 𝑖 𝜕𝑡𝑗
< 0 and  
𝜕2[𝜃𝑐𝑝 ,𝑗  (.)]
𝜕𝑡 𝑖 𝜕𝑡𝑗
 >  
𝜕2[𝛼𝑝 ,𝑗𝑣 𝑔𝑗  ]
𝜕𝑡 𝑖 𝜕𝑡𝑗
 , tax rates are strategic substitutes.  
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It is straight forward to check that, if tax rates are strategic complements (substitutes), tax 
reaction functions are positively (negatively) sloped. That is, when tax rates are strategic 
complements (substitutes), it is optimal for a region to reduce (increase) its tax rate, if there is a 
decrease in its rival region‟s tax rate. We here note that existing studies on tax competition either 
undermines the case for tax rates to be strategic substitutes
10
 or such possibilities does not arise 
due to the choice of specific objective functions of the government.  
In the context of this paper, we assume that tax rates are strategic complements in the remaining 
part of the analysis
11
, so that our results can be compared to the existing literature.  
It is easy to check that, in the case of strategic complements, tax reaction functions are positively 
sloped, since  
𝜕𝑡𝑗
𝜕𝑡𝑖
 
𝑝 ,𝑗
= −
𝜕2  𝑈𝑝 ,𝑗  𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗  
𝜕𝑡𝑖𝜕𝑡𝑗
/
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,𝑗  𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗  
𝜕𝑡𝑗
2  and the denominator is assumed to be negative.  
 
Assumption: Tax rates are strategic complements and, thus, tax reaction functions of the two 
regions’ policy makers are positively sloped:  
𝜕𝑡𝑗
𝜕𝑡𝑖
 
𝑝 ,𝑗
> 0, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.  
Now, note that equation (9a) implies that 𝜃[𝑓′′ 𝑥𝑖 
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
] = 𝛼𝑝𝑖 𝑣
′(𝑔𝑖)[1 − 𝜂𝑖] , where 𝜂𝑖 =
−
𝑡𝑖
𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
< 1, by (2). Rearranging the terms, we can write the implicit form of the tax reaction 
function of the policy maker of region i, given by (9a), as follows.  
1
𝑣 ′(𝑔𝑖)
=
𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖[1 − 𝜂𝑖]
𝜃[𝑓′′ 𝑥𝑖 
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
]
, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2                                                                           (9𝑏) 
The second order condition of maximization is satisfied, since U(.) is assumed to be concave. 
Solving the above two equations for region 1 and 2, given by (9b), we get the stage 2 equilibrium 
tax rates 𝑡1
𝑆  and 𝑡2
𝑆 , where the superscript denotes simultaneous move tax competition:  
                                                     
10
 The reason for the same is as follows. First, strategic substitutability of tax rates is specific condition which hold 
under certain assumptions and does not necessarily hold in case of some popular functional forms in the relevant 
literature. Second, in the tax competition literature, the possibility and results in the context of taxes being strategic 
substitutes has not been explored to that extant. One notable exception to this literature is Vrijburg and de Mooij 
(2016), who explore the conditions for strategic substitute in tax competition. Please refer to them for further 
discussion.  
11
 The further exploration of outcomes of this game in the context of taxes being strategic substitute is left for future 
research and remains beyond the scope of this study. 
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𝑡1
𝑆 = 𝑡1
𝑆 𝛼𝑝 ,1, 𝛼𝑝 ,2                                               (10𝑎) 
𝑡2
𝑆 = 𝑡2
𝑆 𝛼𝑝 ,1, 𝛼𝑝 ,2                                                (10𝑏) 
Before moving to Stage 1 of the game, let us examine the effects of policy makers‟ preferences 
for public good (𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖‟s) on equilibrium tax rates. Since public good is financed by tax revenue 
collected, stronger preference for public good of the policy maker induces the policy maker to 
ensure higher tax revenue. Also, note that tax revenue of a region is increasing in that region‟s 
tax rate: 
𝜕  (𝑡𝑖𝑥𝑖)
𝜕𝑡𝑖
= 𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
+ 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 1 − 𝜂𝑖 > 0, since 𝜂𝑖 < 1 (by (2d)). Therefore, it seems that a 
policy maker would set a higher tax rate, if he has stronger preference for public good. And, 
since tax rates are assumed to be strategic complements, increase in preference for public good 
of a policy maker would induce his rival to set higher tax rate too. 
Proposition 1: In the case of simultaneous move tax competition, degree of preference for public 
good of a policy maker has positive impact on tax rate of both the regions: 
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖
> 0  and 
𝜕𝑡𝑗
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖
> 0, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2. Moreover, increases in tax rate of a region, due to increase in preference 
of the policy maker of that region, is more than the corresponding increase in rival region’s tax 
rate:  
𝜕𝑡1
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
>
𝜕𝑡2
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
.  
Proof: See Appendix A4.  
 
Finally, we turn to analyze the equilibrium choice of policy makers in the two regions in Stage 1. 
In particular, we are interested to examine whether the median voter delegates the task of tax 
determination or not. Note that, in stage 1, the decisive median voter of a region selects the 
policy maker so that her own utility is maximized. In other words, in Stage 1, the median voters 
of the two regions decide whether to delegate the task of tax determination or not, 
simultaneously and independently.  
In Stage 1, the problem of the median voter of region i can be written as follows.  
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖
𝑈𝛽 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖
𝑆 , 𝑡𝑗
𝑆 = 𝜃 𝑐𝛽 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖
𝑆 , 𝑡𝑗
𝑆 +  𝛽 𝑣 𝑡𝑖
𝑆 , 𝑡𝑗
𝑆                                             (11) 
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=   𝜃  𝑓  𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖
𝑆 , 𝑡𝑗
𝑆   − 𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖
𝑆 , 𝑡𝑗
𝑆 𝑓 ′  𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖
𝑆 , 𝑡𝑗
𝑆   + 𝛽 𝑣  𝑡𝑖
𝑆 𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖
𝑆 , 𝑡𝑗
𝑆  ,  where 𝑡𝑖
𝑆  and 𝑡𝑗
𝑆  are 
given by (10a) and (10b), and 𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖
𝑆 , 𝑡𝑗
𝑆  is obtained by substituting the expressions for 𝑡𝑖
𝑆 and 𝑡𝑗
𝑆 
to solution of (1a) and (1b).  
The first order condition of the above problem yields the following.  
1
𝑣 ′(𝑔𝑖)
=
𝛽[1 − 𝜂𝑖𝜑]
𝜃[𝑓′′ 𝑥𝑖 
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
]𝜑
, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2,                                                                 (12) 
where 𝜑 = (
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖
−
𝜕𝑡𝑗
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖
)/
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖
. Clearly, 0 < 𝜑 < 1 , since 0 <
𝜕𝑡𝑗
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖
<
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖
 by Proposition 1. 
Note that both 𝜂𝑖  and 𝜑  functions of 𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖  and 𝛼𝑝 ,𝑗 .  
We get the region i‟s median voter‟s desired public good preference parameter (𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖) from (12).
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However, it appears to be cumbersome to express 𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖  in terms of 𝛽 (or 𝛽  in terms of 𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖), in 
order to gauge the relative magnitudes of 𝛽 and 𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖  , directly from (12). Now, substituting (9b) 
in equation (12), we can check whether there is political delegation in the region or not: 
𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖[1 − 𝜂𝑖]
𝜃[𝑓′′ 𝑥𝑖 
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
]
=
𝛽[1 − 𝜂𝑖𝜑]
𝜃[𝑓′′ 𝑥𝑖 
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
]𝜑
                                                                      (13) 
Clearly, in equilibrium, marginal rate of substitution between the public good and the private 
good remains the same in Stage 1 and Stage 2 of the game. From equation (13), it is 
straightforward to observe that 𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖 > 𝛽, since 0 < 𝜑 < 1, 𝑖 = 1,2. That is, it is optimal for the 
median voter of region i (=1, 2) to delegate the task to determine tax rate on her behalf to a 
policy maker, who has stronger preference for public good than the median voter. And, since two 
regions are symmetric and tax rates are chosen simultaneously, we can say that in equilibrium 
elected policy makers of both the regions will have the same preference for public good: 
𝛼𝑝 ,1
∗ = 𝛼𝑝 ,2
∗ > 𝛽. We summarize this result in the following Proposition. 
                                                     
12
Second order condition of the maximization problem (11) is satisfied. 
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Proposition 2: In equilibrium, political delegation takes place in both the regions, when there is 
simultaneous move tax competition for foreign owned mobile capital. The policy maker of each 
region has higher preference for public good than that of the median voter.     
The explanation for results in proposition 2 arises from the focus of the median voter on higher 
public good provision and further that median voter anticipates that tax competition will lead to 
race-to-the-bottom which can negatively affect the provision of public good. With this 
anticipation, the median voter in either regions delegates tax decision to the policy maker so that 
they are more conscious towards higher public good provision and race-to-the-bottom is 
restricted. 
From Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, it is evident that the equilibrium tax rates of both the 
regions are higher than the case of no delegation. Therefore, through political delegation, 
competing regions can effectively restrict the harmful race-to-the-bottom in tax rates, in the case 
of simultaneous move tax competition. These results are in line with the findings of Persson and 
Tabellini (1992) and Ihori and Yang (2009).    
 
4. SEQUENTIAL MOVE TAX COMPETITION 
We now turn to examine the implications of the timing of move in tax competition and political 
delegation. We first characterize the equilibrium corresponding to sequential move tax 
competition between the two regions. The sequential choice games are motivated in two 
manners in the strategic competition literature. First is based on the first or second mover 
advantage of the regions by being the first in the market or making the decision before the other 
(due to historic, institutional or policy reasons). Second motivation comes from asymmetric 
information literature, where regions are considered to be simultaneous decision makers if they 
17 
 
do not have any information about the decision taken or decision making process of the other 
regions. On the other hand, if one region has more information about decision making process 
of the other region and it is factored in its strategic choice process then this region is called 
leader and other region becomes the follower. 
Since the two regions are symmetric, without any loss of generality we assume that region 1 is 
the leader and region 2 is the follower in tax competition
13
. The stages of the game involved are 
as follows: 
Stage 1: Policy makers of the two regions are elected through political competition, guided by 
majority voting rule, in the two regions.  
Stage 2: Policy maker of region 1 (the leader) decides its tax rate.  
Stage 3: Policy maker of region 2 (the follower) decides its tax rate, observing the tax rate of 
region 1. 
Stage 4: Owners of mobile capital decide the allocation of capital between the two regions. 
We use backward induction method to solve this game, starting with stage 4. In Stage 4, the 
capital allocation is the same as was decided from equation 1 𝑎  and 1(𝑏), assuming the political 
delegation and the tax rates of the leader and the follower region as given.   
Moving up to Stage 3, we consider the problem of region 2 (follower), assuming region 1‟s tax 
rate and public good preference parameters are given. The problem of region 2 is same as in 
equation (8), 
                                                     
13
 We do not model the endogenous nature of leadership in tax competition in this game, as this is not our main 
focus.  This can be explored in future research. 
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𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑡2
𝑈𝑝 ,2 𝑡2, 𝑡1 = 𝜃 𝑐𝑝 ,2 𝑡2, 𝑡1 +  𝛼𝑝 ,2 𝑣 𝑡2, 𝑡1 ,                                            (14)  
The first order condition for region 2 (follower) is as follows: 
𝜕𝑈𝑝 ,2 𝑡2, 𝑡1 
𝜕𝑡2
= 𝜃  −𝑥2𝑓′′ 𝑥2 
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑡2
 +  𝛼𝑝 ,2𝑣
′ 𝑔2  𝑡2
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑡2
+ 𝑥2 = 0                  (15𝑎) 
On simplifying and rearranging the terms we get, 
1
𝑣 ′(𝑔2)
=
𝛼𝑝 ,2[1 − 𝜂2]
𝜃[𝑓′′ 𝑥2 
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑡2
]
                                                                                                   (15𝑏) 
The second order condition is satisfied due to concave 𝑈(. )assumption.  We get the tax reaction 
function of region 2 from (15𝑎).We can write the reaction function of region 2 as, 
𝑡2 = 𝑡2  𝑡1
𝐿 , 𝛼𝑝 ,2                                                  (16) 
Region 2‟s tax rate is a function of the public good preference parameters and region 1‟s tax rate. 
Next, we consider the problem of region 1 in Stage 2. Region 1 decides its tax rate by taking into 
account the strategic effect on region 2‟s tax rate. In the leadership games, we assume that the 
leader knows the reaction function of the follower region and incorporates this information in his 
problem.  
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑡1
𝑈𝑝 ,1 𝑡1, 𝑡2 = 𝜃 𝑐𝑝 ,1 𝑡1, 𝑡2 + 𝛼𝑝 ,1 𝑣 𝑡1, 𝑡2                                                (17) 
Subject to the constraint, 𝑡2 = 𝑡2  𝑡1
𝐿 , 𝛼𝑝 ,2 , as in eq. (16). 
The first order condition for region 1 is, 
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𝜕𝑈𝑝 ,1 𝑡1, 𝑡2 
𝜕𝑡1
= 𝜃  −𝑥1𝑓′′ 𝑥2 
𝜕𝑥1
𝜕𝑡1
 1 −
𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
  +  𝛼𝑝 ,1𝑣
′ 𝑔1  𝑡1
𝜕𝑥1
𝜕𝑡1
 1 −
𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
 + 𝑥1 
=  0,                                                                                                    (18𝑎)   
where 
𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
< 1, by Lemma 2. Now, rearranging the terms of (18a), we can write  
1
𝑣 ′ (𝑔1)
=
𝛼𝑝 ,1[1 − 𝜂1  1 −
𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
 ]
𝜃[𝑓′′ 𝑥1 
𝜕𝑥1
𝜕𝑡1
][1 −
𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
]
 .                                                                      (18𝑏) 
From (18b), we get the optimal tax rate of region 1‟s policy maker:  
𝑡1
𝐿 = 𝑡1
𝐿 𝛼𝑝 ,1, 𝛼𝑝 ,2                                                                    (19𝑎) 
Substituting equation (19), in (16), we also get the optimal tax rate chosen by region 2:  
𝑡2
𝐹 = 𝑡2
𝐹 𝛼𝑝 ,1, 𝛼𝑝 ,2                                                                (19𝑏) 
The properties of the tax rates, as given by (19a) and (19b), are the same as in the case of 
simultaneous move tax competition, only the magnitude of the outcomes have changed. As in 
Proposition 1, it is easy to check that both the tax rates are increasing function of 𝛼𝑝 ,1 and 𝛼𝑝 ,2, 
i.e. public good preference parameters have tax increasing effect. Moreover, it can be checked 
that, if there is an increase in the region 𝑖‟s policy maker‟s preference (value) for public good 
(𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖), increment in region i‟s tax rate would be higher than the increment of the region j‟s tax 
rate, as in the case of simultaneous move tax competition. 
Finally, we turn to Stage 1, i.e., the political competition in the regions. In this stage, the median 
voter decides such a policy maker to set tax rates, who maximizes the median voter‟s utility. 
Here, we are interested to examine whether the median voter delegates the policy making or not. 
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Now, in Stage 1, the problem of the median voter of region i (leader) can be written as follows.  
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖
𝑈𝛽 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖
𝐿 , 𝑡𝑗
𝐹 = 𝜃 𝑐𝛽 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖
𝐿 , 𝑡𝑗
𝐹 +  𝛽 𝑣 𝑡𝑖
𝐿 , 𝑡𝑗
𝐹                                             (20) 
=   𝜃  𝑓  𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖
𝐿 , 𝑡𝑗
𝐹   − 𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖
𝐿 , 𝑡𝑗
𝐹 𝑓 ′  𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖
𝐿 , 𝑡𝑗
𝐹   + 𝛽 𝑣  𝑡𝑖
𝐿  𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖
𝐿 , 𝑡𝑗
𝐹   
The first order condition of this problem can be written as, 
1
𝑣 ′ (𝑔𝑖)
=
𝛽[1 − 𝜂𝑖𝜑]
𝜃[𝑓′′ 𝑥𝑖 
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
]𝜑
, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2,                                                                 (21) 
where 𝜑 = (
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝐿
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖
−
𝜕𝑡𝑗
𝐹
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖
)/
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝐿
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖
. Clearly, 0 < 𝜑 < 1, since 0 <
𝜕𝑡𝑗
𝐹
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖
<
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝐿
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖
would hold true in the 
case of sequential move as well, as in Proposition 1. Note that both 𝜂𝑖  and 𝜑  functions of 
𝛼𝑝 ,𝑖and 𝛼𝑝 ,𝑗 . Similarly, we can solve for the public good preference parameter of the follower 
region j. Since regions are symmetric, the first order condition for the region j‟s median voter‟s 
maximization problem would be similar to that in (21), except that we need to interchange the 
subscripts i and j.   
Note that, we are more concerned about the position of the policy maker in comparison to the 
median voter and not about the exact magnitude of the public good preference parameter. In 
sequential move tax competition, both the regions charge different tax rates. So we analyze their 
political equilibrium separately
14
. 
First, we consider region 2 (the follower). On comparing equation (15b) and (21) we get, 
                                                     
14
 Now, note that, in equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution between public good and private good remains 
constant. We utilise this property to get the relation between the median voter‟s and the policy maker‟s public good 
preferences. 
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1
𝑣 ′(𝑔2)
=
𝛼𝑝 ,2[1 − 𝜂2]
𝜃[𝑓′′ 𝑥2 
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑡2
]
=
𝛽[1 − 𝜂2𝜑]
𝜃[𝑓′′ 𝑥2 
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑡2
]𝜑
                                                              (22) 
The equation for region 2 (follower) is the same as in the simultaneous move tax competition 
game  (13). For  0 < 𝜑 < 1, we can easily observe that 𝛼𝑝 ,2 > 𝛽. This indicates that the policy 
maker in region 2 (follower) is on the right side of median voter. We can say that median voter 
of follower region delegates tax rate decision to the policy maker, who has higher preference for 
the public good compared to the median voter herself. So in the case of follower region, there is 
political delegation with a tax increasing effect. 
Next, we analyze the scenario in region1 (leader). On comparing equation (18b) and (21), we 
obtain, 
1
𝑣 ′(𝑔1)
=
𝛼𝑝 ,1[1 − 𝜂1  1 −
𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
 ]
𝜃[𝑓′′ 𝑥1 
𝜕𝑥1
𝜕𝑡1
][1 −
𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
]
=
𝛽[1 − 𝜂1𝜑]
𝜃[𝑓′′ 𝑥1 
𝜕𝑥1
𝜕𝑡1
]𝜑
                                          (24) 
We can easily show that
 
𝜕𝑡2
𝐹
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
 
 
𝜕𝑡1
𝐿
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
 
=
 𝐵 
 𝐻 
 𝐴 
 𝐻 
=
 𝐵 
 𝐴 
=
 
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡1𝜕𝑡2
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,1
𝜕  𝛼𝑝 ,1𝜕𝑡1
 15
− 
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,1
𝜕  𝛼𝑝 ,1𝜕𝑡1
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡2
2  
= −  
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡1𝜕𝑡2
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡2
2
 =
𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
.  
So we can write, 𝜑 =
𝜕𝑡1
𝐿
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
−
𝜕𝑡2
𝐹
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
𝜕𝑡1
𝐿
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
=  1 −
𝜕𝑡2
𝐹
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
𝜕𝑡1
𝐿
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
 =  1 −
𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
 . Substituting in (24), we get, 
⇒
𝛼𝑝 ,1[1 − 𝜂1𝜑]
𝜃[𝑓′′ 𝑥1 
𝜕𝑥1
𝜕𝑡1
]𝜑
=
𝛽[1 − 𝜂1𝜑]
𝜃[𝑓′′ 𝑥1 
𝜕𝑥1
𝜕𝑡1
]𝜑
                                                              (25) 
                                                     
15 𝜕
2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1𝜕𝑡2
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,1
𝜕𝑡2𝜕𝑡1
= −
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,1
𝜕𝑡1
2
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1𝜕𝑡2
= 0. In these two equations, the first component is the effect of political 
variable on marginal return to tax choice, whereas second component is the marginal effect of other region‟s tax on 
region‟s marginal utility returns. 
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From this simplified equation (25), we can easily deduce that 𝛼𝑝 ,1 = 𝛽. This indicates that in the 
political competition, median voter of region 1 (leader) does not delegate the tax rate decision. 
She decides to become the policy maker herself. This result is in contrast to the simultaneous tax 
competition game, where both the regions delegate the tax rate decision task. So we observe that, 
if the regions move sequentially, it is not necessary that a region delegates the tax rate decision. 
We can say that a region delegates the policy making task only if that region is the follower in 
sequential move tax competition; but does not delegate, if he chooses to be the leader. This 
brings us to our main result. 
Proposition 3: In a sequential equilibrium, there is political delegation in the follower region 
only. There is no political delegation in the leader region, in equilibrium. In the follower region, 
the policy maker has higher preferences for public good compared to the median voter, while in 
the leader region the median voter herself decides to become the policy maker and the median 
voter’s public good preference level is the optimum. 
The intuition behind this result is as follows. In a sequential move tax competition game, if a 
region is the follower, then due to strategic complement nature of tax rates, the follower region‟s 
tax rate is below the leader region‟s tax rate, provided no political competition is considered (see 
Kempf and Rota Graziosi (2010) for proof). At the first stage of the game, the median voter of 
the follower region anticipates that the policy maker will charge lower tax rate compared to the 
leader region, given other things constant, and the provision of public good will be lower than 
desired by her. We know that 
𝜕  (𝑡𝑖𝑥𝑖)
𝜕𝑡𝑖
= 𝑥𝑖 1 − 𝜂𝑖 > 0, i.e. higher tax rate leads to higher tax 
revenue. So there is a scope for tax rate increase without loss of tax revenue. Therefore in 
political competition, she delegates the tax rate decision to such a candidate who values the 
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public good more than her. This puts an upward pressure on tax rates in the follower region 
𝜕𝑡2
𝐹
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,2
> 0 leading to higher tax rate, compared to the no delegation situation, with increased 
public good provision. Conversely, in the leader region tax rates are higher and there is higher 
public good provision compared to the simultaneous move game (no political competition). So in 
stage 1, i.e. in the case of political competition, the median voter takes into consideration this 
result while deciding the political equilibrium. She does not delegate the tax rate decision 
making because the tax rate decided by her (median voter) is optimal to provide public good at 
the median voter‟s desired level. If she delegates the policy making to a candidate with higher 
public good preference, then the corresponding public good provision would have been too high 
compared to the median voter‟s desired level. These results point out that there is an optimal tax 
rate and corresponding public good provision desired by the representative median voter in each 
region. It is not always beneficial for a region to desire higher and higher tax rate to get more 
public good. In the case of the leader region, there is a possibility to charge a higher tax rate; still 
the median voter opts for no delegation to restrict the increase in the tax rate.  
On the welfare implications, we extend the findings of Ihori and Yang (2009) by including a 
sequential choice in tax competition along with political competition.  As is demonstrated in 
Ihori and Yang (2009) and Hoyt (1991) that tax competition leads to under provision of public 
good and political competition with heterogeneous individuals leads to over-provision of public 
good. A combination of these two aspects can lead to optimal provision of public good across the 
regions. We argue that a sequential choice in tax competition has two effects. First, based on 
Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010), only sequential tax competition has welfare improving effect 
on both regions as race-to-the-bottom” in tax rates in restricted. This causes increase in the 
provision of public goods in both regions. Second, the sequential tax competition also affects the 
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political delegation in the presence of elected democracy. In our results, we show that in leader 
region median voter is the policy maker and follower region delegates the tax rate decision 
making to left leaning (higher tax rate) policy maker. Now a leader region will have higher tax 
rate than follower region (Kempf and Rota-Graziosi, 2010) and in turn higher public good 
provision, but the region with political delegation (i.e. leader) will have higher tax rate than 
region with no political delegation (i.e. follower). Thus there are two effects counterbalancing 
each other to reach toward optimal provision of public good
16
. To elaborate further, a leader 
region could have delegated to the policy maker who would then choose higher tax rate and 
higher level of public good but sequential tax competition acts as a strategic restriction for very 
high tax rate and over supply of public good. On the other hand, a follower region decides to 
delegate so that effect of sequential choice to choose lower tax rate is mitigated by political 
delegation leading to optimal tax rate and provision of public good.  Thus we can say that 
Sequential tax competition combined with political delegation acts as an endogenous mechanism 
to ensure that race-to-the-bottom as well as race-to-the-top is restricted in tax rates and provision 
of public good. 
Discussing the capital allocation across the regions, in the sequential tax competition, region 
with higher level of tax would attract lower capital and vice versa. So there would be asymmetry 
in capital allocation. But based on our capital market clearing conditions, the net return to capital 
would be same. These results highlight that when leadership and political competition 
mechanisms are considered jointly in tax competition, as expected there is restriction in „race-to-
the-bottom‟. Further, we observe that sequential political delegation acts as a corrective 
                                                     
16
 Due to general nature  (without functional forms) of objective function and model, we are not able to 
provide a optimal level closed form solution and just the conditions for the same. 
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mechanism to control for levying very high tax rate i.e. there is control on „race-to-the-top‟ in 
public good provision (through tax rate restriction).   
5. CONCLUSION  
This paper investigates the impact of political competition and leadership in intraregional tax 
competition on equilibrium tax rates and local provision of public good to the citizens. We 
consider that there is heterogeneity in the preference for public good by the citizens (voters) in 
both the regions. The political equilibrium is decided by the median voter (through majority 
voting rule) and leadership in tax competition is decided randomly because of symmetric 
regions. We show that, political delegation of tax rate decisions in both the regions leads higher 
tax rates in simultaneous move tax competition.   
However, if the regions choose tax rates sequentially (i.e. there is leadership in tax competition), 
it is not necessary that there is delegation of tax rate decision. We show that only in the follower 
region there is political delegation, whereas in the leader region, median voter becomes the 
policy maker and no political delegation is exercised in equilibrium. This result is in sharp 
contrast to the findings of the existing literature (Persson and Tabellini, 1992; Ihori and Yang, 
2009; Brueckner, 2001).  
The above result also indicates that political delegation acts as a corrective mechanism in 
sequential move tax competition, by restricting the upward spiral of tax rates. This restriction on 
tax rates indicate towards some optimal and desirable level of taxation for public good provision 
that is strategically and competitively viable. 
Some of the possible extensions of this game that can enrich the literature on interaction between 
political economy and fiscal competition and can be considered for further research are as 
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follows. First, in this paper, we consider the leadership decision being exogenous. A possible 
modification of this model with endogenous leadership can complement the findings from 
Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010), Eichner (2014) and others in particular and literature on 
endogenous leadership in supermodular games with incentive structure in general. Second, 
consideration of taxes being strategic substitute and their implications for the outcome of the 
game can enhance the understanding on interaction of political economy with leadership in 
taxation. Third, extension can be explored by including the public investment decision along 
with taxation in affecting the flow of capital in the regions. Lastly, another extension can be to 
consider the case where regions decide the political delegation sequentially
17
. In this case, we 
can understand the implication of joint sequential choice of political delegation and tax rates on 
equilibrium outcomes, flow of capital and provision of public goods.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17
 We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this extension. 
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APPENDIX 
 
1. Single peaked property and median voter theorem 
In the present context, we define the single peaked property and the median voter theorem as 
follows: 
Definition 1
18
: Given any tax rate of region j,  𝑡𝑗 , a tax rate 𝑡𝑖
∗ is the most preferred tax rate of 
voter n in region i, iff 𝑈𝑛 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖
∗,  𝑡𝑗  > 𝑈
𝑛 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖 ,  𝑡𝑗   for all 𝑡𝑖 ≠ 𝑡𝑖
∗, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2. n=1, 2,…N. 
Definition2
19
: Let 𝑡𝑖
′and 𝑡𝑖
′′ are any two tax rates among the possible tax rates for region i, such 
that either 𝑡𝑖
′ , 𝑡𝑖
′′ ≤ 𝑡𝑖
∗ or 𝑡𝑖
′ , 𝑡𝑖
′′ ≥ 𝑡𝑖
∗. Then voter’s preferences are single peaked if and only if 
 𝑈𝑛 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖
′ ,  𝑡𝑗  > 𝑈
𝑛 ,𝑖 𝑡𝑖
′′ ,  𝑡𝑗   ↔   𝑡𝑖
′ − 𝑡𝑖
∗ <  𝑡𝑖
′′ − 𝑡𝑖
∗  ;   𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2; 𝑛 = 1, 2, … 𝑁.  
That is, given any two tax rates on the either side of the optimal (ideal) tax rate, a voter prefers 
one tax rate over the other only if the first tax rate is nearer to the her ideal tax rate compared to 
the second tax rate. Clearly, if the individuals‟ utility functions are concave in tax rate, their 
preferences are single peaked in terms of tax rate. Since, ),(, ji ttU
in  is assumed to be concave in 
( ji tt , ), for all i, j = 1,2 and  n=1,2,...N, individual preferences are single peaked in terms of tax 
rate. Therefore, the median voter theorem, as stated below, holds true in the present context. 
 
A1. Proof of Lemma 1 
(a) 
𝜕[α𝑛 ,𝑖  𝑣 𝑔𝑖 ]
𝜕𝑡𝑖
 = α𝑛 ,𝑖𝑣
′ 𝑔𝑖  𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
+ 𝑥𝑖 = α𝑛 ,𝑖  𝑣
′ 𝑔𝑖  𝑥𝑖 1 − 𝜂𝑖 > 0 , since α𝑛 ,𝑖 > 0  , 𝜂𝑖 < 1 
and 𝑣 ′ 𝑔𝑖 > 0.   
                                                     
18
 Dennis Mueller (2003) 
19
 Dennis Mueller (2003) 
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(b) 
𝜕2[α𝑛 ,𝑖𝑣 𝑔𝑖 ]
𝜕𝑡𝑖
2 = α𝑛 ,𝑖  𝑣
′ 𝑔𝑖  𝑡𝑖
𝜕2𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
2 + 2
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
 + 𝑣 ′′  𝑔𝑖 [𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
+ 𝑥𝑖]
2 = α𝑛 ,𝑖  𝑣
′ 𝑔𝑖 2
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
+
𝑣 ′′  𝑔𝑖 𝑥𝑖
2[1 − 𝜂𝑖]
2 , since 
𝜕2𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
2 = 0. Clearly 
𝜕2[α𝑛 ,𝑖𝑣 𝑔𝑖 ]
𝜕𝑡𝑖
2 < 0, since α𝑛 ,𝑖 > 0,  
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
<0, 𝑣 ′ 𝑔𝑖 > 0 
and 𝑣 ′′  𝑔𝑖 < 0.    
(c)  
𝜕2[α𝑛 ,𝑖  𝑣 𝑔𝑖 ]
𝜕𝑡𝑗 𝜕𝑡𝑖
= α𝑛 ,𝑖  𝑣
′ 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑣
′′  𝑔𝑖  𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
+ 𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖 
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑗
= 𝛼𝑛 ,𝑖 𝑣
′ 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑣
′′  𝑔𝑖 𝑔𝑖 1 −
𝜂𝑖  
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑗
. Now, since [−  
𝑔𝑖 𝑣
′′  𝑔𝑖 
𝑣′  𝑔𝑖 
] < 1  and 0 < 𝜂𝑖 < 1 , 
 −  
𝑔𝑖 𝑣
′′  𝑔𝑖 
𝑣′  𝑔𝑖 
 1 − 𝜂𝑖  < 1. Therefore, 𝛼𝑛 ,𝑖 𝑣
′ 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑣
′′  𝑔𝑖 𝑔𝑖 1 − 𝜂𝑖  
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑗
> 0 , since 𝛼𝑛 ,𝑖 > 0 , 
𝑣 ′ 𝑔𝑖 > 0and
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑗
> 0. QED. 
 
A2. Proof of Theorem 
Suppose that, in region i, the median voter‟s most preferred tax rate is 𝑡𝑖
𝛽 . That is the median 
voter selects the tax rate 𝑡𝑖
𝛽 . Assume that𝑡𝑖
′ ≠ 𝑡𝑖
𝑚 ,say 𝑡𝑖
′ < 𝑡𝑖
𝛽 . Let 𝑅𝛽  are the number of ideal 
tax rates to the right of𝑡𝑖
𝛽 . By the definition of single peaked preferences all  𝑅𝛽 voters prefer 
𝑡𝑖
𝛽 over  𝑡𝑖
′ . As the median position is 𝑡𝑖
𝛽 , we have 𝑅𝛽 ≥ 𝑛/2 . Thus, the voters preferring 
𝑡𝑖
𝛽 over 𝑡𝑖
′  are at least 𝑅𝛽 ≥ 𝑛/2 and in the majority voting rule the median voter is selected as 
the decision maker or the tax rate selected by median voter is preferred by the majority.  
 
A3.  Proof of Lemma 2 
Note that, to prove Lemma 2, it is sufficient to show that the slope of the tax reaction function of 
the region 2‟s policy maker, in 𝑡1 − 𝑡2 plane, is less than one. Now note that the slope of the tax 
reaction function of the region 2‟s policy maker, in 𝑡1 − 𝑡2  plane, is given by  
𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
 
𝑝 ,2
=
−
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2 𝑡1 ,𝑡2 
𝜕𝑡1𝜕𝑡2
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2 𝑡1 ,𝑡2 
𝜕𝑡2
2  , where 
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2 𝑡1 ,𝑡2 
𝜕𝑡1𝜕𝑡2
and 
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2 𝑡1 ,𝑡2 
𝜕𝑡2
2 are obtained by differentiating (9a), 
for i=2, with respect to 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, respectively. That is,  
 𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
 
𝑝 ,2
= − [
𝜕2[𝜃c𝑝 ,2  (.)]
𝜕𝑡1𝜕𝑡2
+
𝜕2[α𝑝 ,2𝑣 𝑔2 ]
𝜕𝑡1𝜕𝑡2
] [
𝜕2[𝜃c𝑝 ,2  (.)]
𝜕𝑡2
2 +
𝜕2[α𝑝 ,2𝑣 𝑔2 ]
𝜕𝑡2
2 ] = −
𝐴+𝐵
𝐶+𝐷
, where 
𝐶 =
𝜕2 𝜃c𝑝 ,2 .  
𝜕𝑡2
2 = −𝜃 𝑥𝑗 𝑓
′′′  𝑥𝑗  + 𝑓
′′  𝑥𝑗    
𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝜕𝑡𝑗
 
2
= −
𝜕2 𝜃c𝑝 ,2 .  
𝜕𝑡1 𝜕𝑡2
= −𝐴 , 𝐵 =
𝜕2 α𝑝 ,2𝑣 𝑔2  
𝜕𝑡1 𝜕𝑡2
   and 
 𝐷 =
𝜕2 α𝑝 ,2𝑣 𝑔2  
𝜕𝑡2
2 .  We have  𝐶 + 𝐷 < 0 , since 𝑈
𝑝 ,2 .   is concave.  Therefore,  
𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
 
𝑝 ,2
<
1𝐴 + 𝐵 < − 𝐶 + 𝐷 𝐵 + 𝐷 < 0, since 𝐴 + 𝐶 = 0.Now,  
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𝐵 + 𝐷 = α𝑝 ,2  𝑣
′ 𝑔2 2
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑡2
+ 𝑣 ′′  𝑔2 𝑥2
2 1 − 𝜂2 
2 +  𝑣 ′ 𝑔2 + 𝑣
′′  𝑔2 𝑔2 1 − 𝜂2  
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑡1
  
          = α𝑝 ,2{𝑣
′ 𝑔2 2
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑡2
+ 𝑣 ′′  𝑔2 𝑥2
2 1 − 𝜂2 
2 −  𝑣 ′ 𝑔2 + 𝑣
′′  𝑔2 𝑔2 1 − 𝜂2  
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑡2
} 
=  α𝑝 ,2{𝑣
′ 𝑔2 
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑡2
+ 𝑣 ′′  𝑔2 𝑥2
2 1 − 𝜂2 
2 − 𝑣 ′′  𝑔2 𝑔2 1 − 𝜂2 
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑡2
} < 0 , since 
𝜕𝑥2
 𝜕𝑡2
< 0,  𝜂2 <
1, 𝑣 ′′  𝑔2 < 0 and 𝑣
′ 𝑔2 > 0. Hence,  
𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
 
𝑝 ,2
< 1. QED. 
 
 A4. Proof of Proposition 1 
Differentiating (9a) with respect to 𝛼𝑝 ,1 , we get 
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,1
𝜕𝑡1
2
𝜕𝑡1
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
+
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,1
𝜕𝑡2𝜕𝑡1
𝜕𝑡2
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
+
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,1
𝜕 𝛼𝑝 ,1𝜕𝑡1
= 0 
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡1𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
+
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡2
2
𝜕𝑡2
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
+
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1𝜕𝑡2
= 0 
From the above two equations, we can write 
𝜕𝑡1
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
=
 𝐴 
 𝐻 
 and 
𝜕𝑡2
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
=
 𝐵 
 𝐻 
, where  𝐻 =
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,1
𝜕𝑡1
2
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡2
2 −
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡1𝜕𝑡2
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,1
𝜕𝑡2𝜕𝑡1
,  𝐴 = −
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,1
𝜕  𝛼𝑝 ,1𝜕𝑡1
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡2
2 +
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1𝜕𝑡2
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,1
𝜕𝑡2𝜕𝑡1
 and  𝐵 = −
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,1
𝜕𝑡1
2
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1𝜕𝑡2
+
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡1𝜕𝑡2
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,1
𝜕  𝛼𝑝 ,1𝜕𝑡1
. Now, note that  𝐻 > 0  (since the equilibrium is assumed to be stable),  
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,1
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1𝜕𝑡1
= 𝑣 ′ 𝑔1 𝑥1 1 − 𝜂1 > 0  (since 𝜂1 < 1) , 
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡2
2 < 0  (by second order condition of 
maximization), 
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1𝜕𝑡2
= 0  (since 𝑈𝑝 ,2(. )  does not depend on 𝛼𝑝 ,1 ),  
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡1𝜕𝑡2
> 0 . Therefore, 
 𝐴 > 0  and  𝐵 > 0 . So, we get, 
𝜕𝑡1
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
> 0  and 
𝜕𝑡2
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
> 0 .  Now, note that 
𝜕𝑡1
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
−
𝜕𝑡2
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
>
0  −
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡2
2 >
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡1𝜕𝑡2
.  Since,  
𝜕𝑡2
𝜕𝑡1
 
𝑝 ,2
= −
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2 𝑡1 ,𝑡2 
𝜕𝑡1𝜕𝑡2
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2 𝑡1 ,𝑡2 
𝜕𝑡2
2 < 1 , by Lemma 2, and 
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2 𝑡1 ,𝑡2 
𝜕𝑡2
2 < 0, we have  −
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡2
2 >
𝜕2𝑈𝑝 ,2
𝜕𝑡1𝜕𝑡2
. Therefore, 
𝜕𝑡1
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
>
𝜕𝑡2
𝑆
𝜕𝛼𝑝 ,1
. QED. 
 
